At a forum with the self-declared Royal Hashemite Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah in July 2010, Sara Duterte (center back) was seen proudly standing behind Fuad Kiram (front, second from the left). Image Source: “The Royal Hashemite Sultanate of Sulu and Sabah” (Facebook).

With Marcos barred from seeking another term and no clear successor emerging from his camp, Duterte—daughter of former president Rodrigo Duterte—enters the race as an early and formidable contender in a political system where personal networks and long campaigns often determine outcomes.

Although the election is still two years away, attention is already turning to what a Duterte presidency could mean for sensitive territorial questions, particularly the long-dormant Sabah dispute linked to the heirs of the former Sultanate of Sulu. Public debate in the Philippines over the Sulu arbitration and Sabah claim remains limited. There are no formal nationwide polls on the issue, and it rarely commands sustained media coverage — suggesting it is viewed by many as peripheral rather than central to national concerns. The government of Duterte’s political rival, President Marcos, has previously characterized the matter in 2022 as a private dispute between the Sulu claimants and Malaysia, rather than an issue of core national interest.

“President Marcos, has previously characterized the matter in 2022 as a private dispute between the Sulu claimants and Malaysia, rather than an issue of core national interest.”

Sara Duterte’s past associations, however, have drawn scrutiny for an altogether different position. In 2008, she attended the “2nd Mindanao MNLF Leadership Peace Summit” in Davao City, where she and her father both served as mayor. Also present were Nur Misuari, founder of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and Fuad Abdulla Kiram, who styles himself as Sultan of Sulu and Sabah and is the key figurehead for the now defeated Sulu arbitration worth nearly $15 billion in claims.

The convergence of these figures is sensitive given Mindanao and Sabah’s long history of armed insurgency. The MNLF was linked to the 2013 Zamboanga City crisis, while another claimed member of the Sulu Sultanate—Jamaulul Kiram III—and the so-called Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu carried out the deadly Lahad Datu incursion in Sabah earlier that year.

Despite episodes of violence associated with the MNLF, both Rodrigo and Sara Duterte maintained political ties with Misuari. In 2010, Sara Duterte also appeared at a forum co-hosted by a group linked to Kiram. Her attendance at such events went beyond routine protocol and signaled openness to narratives surrounding the Sulu claim. Coming after her earlier appearance at the MNLF summit, it reinforced perceptions of a pattern of tacit support for actors advocating contentious territorial positions.

Rodrigo Duterte himself amplified the issue while in office. In 2016, he publicly pledged to pursue the Philippine claim to Sabah until the end of his presidency, asserting that the country would not abandon what he described as a historical right—language that Sara Duterte has echoed in gentler yet clear terms during her time as Davao City’s mayor.

“In 2016, Rodrigo Duterte publicly pledged to pursue the Philippine claim to Sabah until the end of his presidency.”

Why might Sara Duterte revisit or align herself with such themes? The explanation lies in domestic political calculus and the assumption that the Sabah dispute curries favor in Sulu and Mindanao. In the 2022 national elections, she secured overwhelming support in the Bangsamoro region.

And in what must have been a lead up to her declaring her candidacy, Sara Duterte reportedly called in September of 2025 Muedzul-Lail Tan Kiram, often seen as the more legitimate claimant to the House of Kiram and whose calls for peaceful resolution on the issue of Sabah act as a counterweight to the militancy of Jamalul III and other disruptive actors like Fuad Kiram; of course, like other claimants, Muedzul has never renounced his claim to Sabah as a royal fief. Tausug responses on social media to Duterte’s call indicate a positive reception, with comments such as, “Tausugs are 100% supporting her” and “She is our last hope.”

In the days since she declared her presidential candidacy, she has also received backing from the One Bangsamoro Movement (1Bangsa), an advocacy group that has opposed moves to separate Sulu from the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). The debate intensified after the Philippine Supreme Court recognized that a majority of voters in Sulu had rejected joining BARMM in an earlier plebiscite. 1Bangsa argued that the region would be incomplete without Sulu, describing it as central to Bangsamoro identity.

If Duterte were to win the presidency, advocates of retaining Sulu within BARMM could gain a powerful ally in Manila. Yet there are competing narratives; those advanced by the Kiram lineage and other Moro stakeholders do not always align. Everyday priorities in Mindanao remain rooted in security, infrastructure, and economic development rather than foreign territory or private claims to wealth. Large parts of Mindanao continue to lag behind other regions in development, and Sulu is the poorest of the country’s 82 provinces. Where the Sulu legacy is concerned, public narratives generally focus more on the challenges facing Tausug and Bangsamoro identity domestically rather than in Sabah. Duterte’s recent courting of the more moderate Muedzul rather than controversial characters like Fuad Kiram might suggest an acknowledge of these priorities.

“If Duterte were to win the presidency, advocates of retaining Sulu within BARMM could gain a powerful ally in Manila.”

Another possibility is that invoking the Sabah claim appeals to nationalist constituencies beyond Sulu itself. But the practical benefits are unclear. With bread-and-butter issues dominating public concern, reopening a dormant territorial dispute could strain ties within ASEAN and risk diplomatic friction with little gain. Given the Duterte family’s history of engagement with armed actors in Mindanao, any renewed focus on Sabah would likely be closely watched both at home and abroad.

REFERENCES

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Chi, C. (2025, August 7). VP Sara defense shifts focus to Supreme Court as Senate shelves impeachment. Philstar.com. https://www.philstar.com

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